Recommendations to Improve Richmond's Government

In July 2008, in the wake of conflicts between the Richmond City Council and the mayor, the council passed a resolution establishing a Charter Review Commission.

The resolution directs the commission to "focus its work on correcting conflicts and ambiguities in the present Charter to provide greater clarity but not to change the fundamental powers and responsibilities of the Mayor and City Council." The commission recently published its preliminary recommendations and now invites thoughts and comments from the public.

Here is a summary of those recommendations:

Council appointment of council staff -- The charter grants the chief administrative officer (CAO) "ultimate responsibility" for "city personnel." In the past, the City Council has appointed its own chief of staff, legislative liaisons, and others who function directly to support the council's legislative role. The charter does not explicitly tell us whether those employees fall within the CAO's control. A dispute over this provision led to a lawsuit in the previous administration. The commission recommends a charter amendment to clarify that the council has the power to hire or remove such employees.

Ensuring the independence of the city attorney -- The current charter gives the City Council sole control over appointment and removal of the city attorney. That appears to be a holdover from the council-manager form of government under which the city attorney's main role was to advise the council on the legality, form, and effect of legislation. Today the city attorney serves as chief legal adviser to the council, the mayor, the CAO, and all departments and agencies of the city.

While all of those constituents rely on his advice, no single constituent is his "client." Rather, the city attorney represents the city itself as an entity, much like the general counsel of a corporation represents the corporation, not its individual officers and directors. On issues where the council and mayor disagree, the city attorney must be free to exercise independent judgment. And all constituents must view him as neutral.

The commission believes that the city attorney's role as independent and neutral legal adviser would best be served by a structure that provides both the mayor and the council equal roles in appointment and removal. Our preliminary recommendation calls for the mayor to appoint the city attorney, subject to confirmation by the council, and provides that the city attorney could be removed only when the mayor and the council agree to do so.

Shortly after we released our preliminary recommendations, comments appeared in

The Times-Dispatch that, I believe, reflect a misunderstanding of our proposal. The commission does not recommend that the city attorney serve at the pleasure of the mayor. Rather, under our proposal no mayor could fire a city attorney unless a majority of the council agreed. Moreover, to avoid making the attorney's position a target for political patronage, the commission recommends appointment for an indefinite term, or at least a fixed term longer than a mayor's four-year term of office.

Ensuring the autonomy of the city auditor -- The charter currently calls for the council to appoint and remove the city auditor. If the auditor functioned only as a legislative "watchdog" that monitored expenditures by the administration, that structure would make sense. But city funds can be spent by other means as well: by council members or staff, by boards and commissions appointed by the council, and by private contractors fulfilling mandates of the City Council.

Sometimes an auditor's findings will embarrass the mayor or the CAO. Other times those findings may be critical of programs favored by the council. In either event, an auditor is best capable of doing the job when his job security does not depend upon the grace of the folks he must criticize.

For that reason, the commission believes the autonomy of the audit function would best be served by a structure that required both the mayor and the City Council to agree before an auditor could be removed. And, just as with the city attorney, we believe the neutrality of the auditor is best guaranteed by a process that requires the council and the mayor to concur in the appointment. The auditor would not be the "council's auditor" or the "mayor's auditor." He would be the city's auditor.

Expediting appointment of the chief administrative officer (CAO) -- The charter provides that the mayor appoints the CAO, subject to advice and consent of the City Council. But it sets no time limits for the process and does not provide for any contingency when the mayor and the council can't agree. The commission recommends some time limits: 180 days for the mayor to act and 30 days for the council to approve or reject the appointment. And our recommendation calls for a neutral body to make an interim appointment if that process fails. The aim is to prevent extended periods with no CAO.

The mayor's veto power -- Subject to override by six votes of the City Council, the charter grants the mayor power to veto any ordinance that "imposes duties" on him, on the CAO, or on any city department head. But that language masks a serious ambiguity. Does it mean that the mayor may veto only those ordinances that explicitly impose a duty, such as an ordinance directing the mayor to sign a contract? Or does the veto power extend more broadly to any ordinance that creates some duty to act as a practical matter?

An ordinance leasing real estate may not explicitly create any duty, but implicitly it would require someone in city administration to provide keys and collect rent. The commission believes the veto power needs greater clarity. We recommend a general veto power applicable to any ordinance. Such a provision would be clear and unambiguous. And because the existing override power of the City Council would remain intact, the change would not significantly alter the existing balance between council and mayor.

Other provisions -- We looked at the budget process where the charter is quite detailed and, to us, appears sufficiently clear, though we recognize there may still be important unresolved questions about budget implementation. We considered writing mandatory dispute resolution procedures into the charter in an effort to forestall future litigation. Our preliminary conclusion is that a charter cannot effectively mandate procedures flexible enough to deal with every kind of conflict, though we hope to recommend voluntary steps that may help guide future efforts to resolve disputes.

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What happens next?

A public hearing will take place on Tuesday at 6:30 p.m. in the City Council chambers. The commission will provide a final report to the council in late September. The council then determines whether to ask the 2010 General Assembly to amend the charter.

The views of informed citizens have made a difference and will continue to matter throughout this process. On behalf of the commission, I encourage everyone to join us Tuesday and participate in the process of shaping your city government.
John Douglass is chairman of the Charter Review Commission and dean of the University of Richmond School of Law. The full text of the commission's preliminary recommendations is available at charter.richmondva.gov.