What Others Are Saying About Afghanistan

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Karin von Hippel and Frederick Barton, Center for Strategic and International Studies:

America may not be losing the war in Afghanistan, but it is also not winning. Neither is the U.S. approach in neighboring Pakistan making friends or preventing new recruits from crossing the border to kill U.S. and other NATO troops. What then is the best way to promote peace and security in the greater South Asia region? . . .

First, the U.S. government needs to get its own house in order. It needs a unifying and integrated strategy, what the British government calls a "whole-of-government" approach . . . .A counterinsurgency campaign should incorporate development, security, and governance activities, yet here too the U.S. government lacks a truly integrated plan, one that is understood by civilians and soldiers alike . . . .

Second, the United States needs to reengage with its allies . . . .

Third, the U.S. administration and the aforementioned allies together should develop a coherent strategy for engaging and working with the regional players in an expanded contact group . . . .

Finally, and critically, the people and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan need to become full partners in this policy and approach. Too many decisions are being made on their behalf, without their involvement or buy in.

. . .

Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan):

U.S. President Barack Obama announced . . . a comprehensive strategy for U.S. Afghan policy that marks a major change from the previous one and he declared his aim to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida."

In Afghanistan, al-Qaida and the Taliban -- the nation's former rulers -- have stepped up their military offensive and expanded their sphere of control. As they have established operational bases in Pakistan, one of Afghanistan's neighbors, U.S. operations to destroy them in Afghanistan have been beset with difficulties.

If the terrorists are left unchecked, we may see another tragedy similar to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States . . .

However, it is uncertain to what extent the new strategy will be effective in producing results in the complicated social situation that exists in Afghanistan, a multiethnic country where national reconciliation is fraught with difficulties . . . .

Pakistan's cooperation is indispensable for the complete removal of the terrorist forces' operational bases in the country. However, the administration of President Asif Ali Zardari is being hounded by the opposition and the nation's political situation is quite unstable. Urgent steps must be taken to stabilize Pakistan.

Jackson Diehl, The Washington Post:

Three time bombs are buried within the new and ambitious strategy for Afghanistan that President Obama unveiled . . . .

The first fuse is burning down toward Aug. 20, [when] Afghanistan is due to hold a presidential election whose outcome and perceived fairness may determine whether most Afghans continue to view U.S. and NATO forces as friendly . . . .

The second time bomb is set for the summer of 2010, when a war that is now regarded in Washington as jointly owned by the Bush and Obama administrations will have become Obama's alone -- for better or worse . . . .

[The third bomb:] So far the international coalition is succeeding in reconstructing only one Afghan institution: the national army . . . .The best of Afghanistan's high school graduates are being siphoned off for officer training and a new four-year military academy modeled on West Point. That's good -- only there has been no corresponding effort to build the capacity of the Afghan government and judiciary . . . .

"People here know how to solve every problem in the world except the problem of governance -- but that is the one that matters most," says a Kabul-based diplomat.

. . .

Juan Cole, Salon.com:

President Barack Obama may or may not be doing the right thing in Afghanistan, but the rationale he gave for it . . . is almost certainly wrong. Obama has presented us with a 21st century version of the domino theory . . . .

This latter-day domino theory of al-Qaida takeovers in South Asia is just as implausible as its earlier iteration in Southeast Asia (ask Thailand or the Philippines). Most of the allegations are not true or are vastly exaggerated. There are very few al-Qaida fighters based in Afghanistan proper. What is being called the "Taliban" is mostly not Taliban at all (in the sense of seminary graduates loyal to Mullah Omar). The groups being branded "Taliban" only have substantial influence in 8 to 10 percent of Afghanistan, and only 4 percent of Afghans say they support them . . . .

As for a threat to Pakistan, the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] areas are smaller than Connecticut, with a total population of a little over 3 million, while Pakistan itself is bigger than Texas, with a population more than half that of the entire United States. A few thousand Pashtun tribesmen cannot take over Pakistan, nor can they "kill" it . . . .

Obama's dark vision of the overthrow of the Afghanistan government by al-Qaida-linked Taliban or the "killing" of Pakistan by small tribal groups differs little from the equally apocalyptic and implausible warnings issued by John McCain and Dick Cheney about an "al-Qaida" victory in Iraq . . . .When a policymaker gets the rationale for action wrong, he is at particular risk of falling into mission creep and stubborn commitment to a doomed and unnecessary enterprise.