Election 2009: Competence

The post-mortems regarding Virginia's gubernatorial campaign continue. Many analysts cite Bob McDonnell's landslide as an example for a GOP surge in the 2010 midterms. Some even mention McDonnell as a national figure in 2012. Today we focus on the mechanics of this year's race.

The question for Creigh Deeds asks, "What went wrong?" Deeds entered the general election on a high after easily defeating Terry McAuliffe and Brian Moran in the Democratic primary. The early polls showed a tight contest between McDonnell and Deeds; surveys gave the Democrat a slight lead. The consensus held that Deeds ran a masterful primary campaign, albeit one dictated by circumstances. A Washington Post endorsement of Deeds is credited with impelling him to victory (or at least with generating momentum in his direction) and has entered the state's political lore. During the Democratic intramurals, Deeds came off as the nice guy. He may have won in large part because voters disliked the other two.

Much of the commentary on the McDonnell-Deeds match-up emphasized strategy and tactics. Several weeks before the election, McDonnell surged to a decisive lead. Democratic blame-mongering commenced well before the vote. An extraordinary story prior to Nov. 3 cited White House prima donnas as complaining that Deeds did not follow their advice -- that, in other words, he did not tie himself closely to Barack Obama, who only one year before became the first Democratic presidential nominee since Lewis Cass (well, since Lyndon Johnson) to carry Virginia. Others point to the contentious debates on health care, cap-and-trade, card check, and other national issues and wonder if the Obama ploy would have worked. Indeed, McDonnell scored points by raising the national questions.

The underlying problem for Deeds may have had little to do with strategy and tactics, however; at times the Deeds campaign appeared incompetent. Groups reported great frustration in trying to set up meetings and forums with Deeds. The candidate himself proved inept when working crowds. The Democrats dispatched mediocre surrogates to events where Deeds' presence was required. Appointments that should have been scheduled in a day or two took several days or more.

The McDonnell effort never faltered. The candidate and his team stayed on message. If someone were to ask aides who would win the Notre Dame game, the snap answer would say, "Bob's for jobs." "Honey, what's for breakfast?" "Bob's for jobs." And so on. McDonnell arrived early at breakfasts, lunches, and dinners -- and lingered. He did not rehash old stories about setting out for college with $80 in his pocket but would address issues of immediate concern to his audience. He explained the state implications of Obama's far-out agenda. His staff promptly returned calls and e-mails.

The only bump occurred when stories of his graduate thesis broke. Even then, McDonnell responded with vigor and speed. The Post pounded the story, yet McDonnell never relented in his persistence that voters were interested in day-to-day issues such as jobs, transportation, and education. He pointed to his record as attorney general. Numerous female colleagues and associates praised him as a leader, manager, and mentor. His daughter -- a veteran of the war in Iraq -- appeared in one of the most effective campaign commercials in recent memory. The timing of the thesis story redounded to McDonnell's benefit as well. The news surfaced early in the campaign, thereby allowing him ample opportunity to counter any negative reaction. If the story had waited until the final days of a close race, it would have proved far more damaging -- and could have proved fatal. We suspect McDonnell outsmarted the opposition.

By November, The Post's endorsement of Deeds seemed beside the point. McDonnell won the battleground jurisdictions in Northern Virginia. He swept Central Virginia, where his margins approached 2-to-1. Virginia Beach delivered decisively for its favorite son. McDonnell took the rural regions that supposedly accounted for Deeds' natural strength. In the end, McDonnell earned the most impressive gubernatorial win since George Allen defeated Mary Sue Terry in 1993. Deeds and Terry share the distinction of being Democrats with rural roots who were routed in Virginia's suburbs.

. . .

This year Virginia preserved its tradition of voting for gubernatorial candidates of the party opposite that of the White House's current occupant. In every gubernatorial election since 1977, victory has gone to the other team. For Democrats, the trend grows still more dispiriting. The last Virginia Democrat to win the governorship during a Democratic administration was Mills Godwin in 1965, when LBJ held sway. In 1973, Godwin won the governor's race as a Republican, but that's another odyssey.

The skein from 1977 remains unbroken. Prior to this year's chapter in the partisan saga, we reported that a similar streak related to competence. It is possible to mount compelling campaigns and still lose. The fates simply may work against certain candidates. Yet in almost every election during Virginia's historic stretch the loser has run a desultory campaign, a campaign much weaker than his or her competitor's. Deeds did not prove an exception to the rule. This is not something we will pretend to understand.