Correspondent of the Day
Marshall Needs Praise, Not Hagiography
Editor, Times-Dispatch: I found Brian Shaw's Commentary article about George C. Marshall quite interesting. Marshall is a fascinating character, and one for which a proper study has yet to be developed.
He became an iconic character early in WWII and, to date, the only studies devoted to him have been paeans such as Pogue's biography.
Marshall had many virtues. He possessed an admirable clarity of vision and an ability to take decisive action in administrative matters.
Marshall may at some time be forgotten by the U.S. Army, but his reduction of warfare to the simple principles of "move, shoot, and communicate" will survive for centuries. He selected an outstanding cast of folks he felt capable of high command and these made the U.S. Army the formidable instrument it was by 1945.
Marshall also had defects. He was hampered in forming clear communications. He seems to have been incisive in verbal directives but his cable communications are often murky, and this played a significant role in the unreadiness of the U.S. military in the Pacific in December 1941.
He lacked a clarity of strategic vision in Europe, the Orient, and the Mediterranean.
Marshall was often a compromising voice when the war effort required a strong advocate for a given position. And he often advocated tactics, such as the use of atomic bombs to clear beachheads, which were not well-considered.
I simply wish to note that we have yet to have a balanced assessment of Marshall as a military leader. As it stands, all we have is adulation, and the fine points on Marshall's failings can be found only in studies of specific campaigns or in the biographies of other leaders.
Marc James Small.
Chester.
Advertisement
Reader Reactions
Mr. Small, I have to wonder how much of Marshall’s ‘murkiness’ and ‘lack of vision’ was less a personal flaw than response to political considerations? His handling of communications prior to Pearl Harbor was most certainly in response to wishes of the White House. Despite Pearl Harbor, the decision early on was to concentrate resources on the European Theater. That was a political decision too. As far as Europe itself, we had Allies with opinions that had to be taken into consideration. Churchill pushed the ‘soft underbelly’ strategy in keeping with his marriage to the strategic vision of people like Liddel-Hart. It didn’t hurt that this strategy would also serve to clear the Med and guarantee communications/logistics with Britain’s imperial possessions. I’m not saying Marshall’s going along with all this was right, but after all he WAS only Chief of Staff, not the President or Prime Minister.
Post a Comment(Requires free registration)
- Please avoid offensive, vulgar, or hateful language.
- Respect others.
- Use the "Flag Comment" link when necessary.
- See the Terms and Conditions for details.


Advertisement