Opinion Roundup: What Others Say About Afghanistan

Katrina Vanden Heuvel, The Nation:

Senator Russ Feingold was way ahead of the Senate curve in insisting on a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq, and . . . he got it right again in calling for a flexible timetable to bring U.S. troops out of Afghanistan . . . .

He voices particular concern about the war destabilizing Pakistan -- "a witch's brew of threats to our national security that we cannot afford to further destabilize." He also points out that this "nation-building experiment . . . may distract us from combating al-Qaida and its affiliates, not just in Pakistan, but in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and other terrorist sanctuaries."

Feingold lays out a compelling case for an alternative course -- "a civilian-led strategy discouraging any support for the Taliban by Pakistani security forces, and offer[ing] assistance to improve Afghanistan's economy while fighting corruption in its government . . . ."

Feingold is expressing what many progressives now believe. Overall, 51 percent of Americans say the war is not worth fighting, including 7 in 10 Democrats . . . .

. . .

Are we "nation-building"? With U.S. commanders talking about ending Afghanistan's "culture of poverty," it sounds like it. Yet, even assuming you could build a nation in any meaningful sense of the word on Afghan soil, such a nation would be profoundly uncongenial to us.

Are we there just to quarantine al-Qaida in their Pakistani redoubts and whack any bad guys who wander in range? That might be worthwhile, but is a tough sell to NATO forces who (excepting Brits, Canucks, and a couple of others) operate under ludicrously constrained rules of engagement . . . .

The much misunderstood British strategy in Afghanistan was, by contrast, admirably clear-sighted, and worked (for them) for over a century. They took a conscious decision not to incorporate the country formally within the Indian Empire because they didn't want a direct British land border with Russia. So instead they were content with a highly decentralized semi-client state and a useful buffer between the British Empire and the Tsars . . . .

The British strategy was cold and calculated and, if you care about Afghan child mortality rates and women's rights, very unprogressive. But it was less deluded than asking Western troops to die in pursuit of [a] chimera.

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The strategic importance of Afghanistan is difficult for critics of the war to deny. The events of Sept. 11, 2001, which began in state-sponsored terror academies there, are not yet generally regarded as a myth. The spread of Taliban havens in Afghanistan would permit al-Qaida to return to its historical operating areas . . . . And Taliban advances in Afghanistan could push a fragile, nuclear Pakistan toward chaos . . . .

Iraq, the recent model for counterinsurgency success, is different from Afghanistan. Afghanistan's population is more dispersed; its insurgency more rural. Small contingents of troops are needed in more locations to secure population centers. The Afghan insurgency is also mainly indigenous -- in contrast to Iraq, where foreign leadership was eventually resented and resisted.

But America is not without advantages in this fight. The people of Afghanistan know what it is like to live under the Taliban, and there is no evidence they want to go back to it. Afghan consent for the American presence in their country, according to polls, is resilient and sustained . . .

Can we make Afghan lives better? There are no guarantees, but there are precedents . . . .

. . .

I am really sick and tired of listening to people like Michael Gerson tell me that we have "No Choice But To Try" in Afghanistan -- and then simply refuse to tell me what victory looks like. He's not alone . . . .Max Boot wrote paragraph after paragraph in The Wall Street Journal about "How To Win in Afghanistan" and nowhere in this chest-thumping screed could he be bothered with explaining what winning actually means. Tony Cordesman tells the world, here is How We Lose in Afghanistan, but can't be hassled with an explanation of how victory is achieved.

Enough already. If you can't define victory, if you can't explain what the end game looks like, if you can't say when the U.S. role in Afghanistan will end; if you can't explain how the current U.S. mission in Afghanistan can be achieved . . . then why should anyone listen to you?